It is well known that Gödel's incompleteness theorems hold for 1 -definable theories containing Peano arithmetic. We generalize Gödel's incompleteness theorems for arithmetically definable theories. First, we prove that every n+1 -definable n -sound theory is incomplete. Secondly, we generalize and improve Jeroslow and Hájek's results. That is, we prove that every consistent theory having n+1 set of theorems has a true but unprovable n sentence. Lastly, we prove that no n+1 -definable n -sound theory can prove its own n -soundness. These three results are generalizations of Rosser's improvement of the first incompleteness theorem, Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, and the second incompleteness theorem, respectively. §1. Introduction. As it is inscribed in the title of the famous paper, Gödel's incompleteness theorems were proved for a particular system, Principia Mathematica PM. The proofs were based on the three facts-that PM is defined primitive recursively, PM is ω-consistent, and PM includes arithmetic. Hence, as Gödel had pointed out in the paper, Gödel's theorems are applicable to similar theories which satisfy these three conditions. Gödel's theorems have been generalized further and currently they are often stated as follows: for any extension T of Peano arithmetic PA, if T is 1 -definable and 1 -sound, then T is incomplete (the first incompleteness theorem), and if T is 1 -definable and consistent, then the consistency of T is not provable in T (the second incompleteness theorem).
that can prove all true 2 sentences? Using the result above, we show also that if T is a n+1 -consistent theory having a n+2 set of theorems, then T is incomplete. Next, we examine the second incompleteness theorem. We prove that no n+1 -definable n -sound theory can prove its own n -soundness. In addition, we study the consistency statements for n -definable theories. We prove that for every n+1 -definable and n -sound theory T , there is a consistency statement for some axiomatization of T which is independent of T . Thus appropriate consistency statements can be witnesses for the generalized version of the Gödel-Rosser first incompleteness theorem. §2. Preliminaries. In this paper, we call a set of sentences a theory. Thus a theory is identified with its axiom set. We consider only theories in the language of first-order arithmetic {+, ×, 0, 1, <}. We assume that T and U always denote theories containing Peano arithmetic PA. Let ω be the set of all nonnegative integers. For each n ∈ ω,n denotes the numeral for n. For each formula ϕ, gn(ϕ) is the Gödel number of ϕ, and ϕ denotes the numeral for gn(ϕ).
We recursively define the classes n and n of formulas for every n ∈ ω as follows: 0 = 0 is the class of all formulas all of whose quantifiers are bounded; n+1 (resp. n+1 ) is the class of all formulas of the form ∃ xϕ (resp. ∀ xϕ) for some ϕ ∈ n (resp. ϕ ∈ n ), and here quantifiers preceding ϕ are allowed to be absent. We say a formula is n (PA) (resp. n (PA)) if it is PA-provably equivalent to some formula in n (resp. n ). Throughout this paper, we sometimes omit '(PA)' if there is no danger of confusion. A formula is called n (N) (resp. n (T )) if it is equivalent to both some n formula and some n formula in N (resp. T ). We suppose that the subscript n of n , n and n ranges over ω unless otherwise stated.
We say a formula σ (u) is a definition of a theory T if and only if {n ∈ ω : N | σ (n)} = {gn(ϕ) : ϕ ∈ T }. Let be a class of formulas. A definition of T which is a formula is called a definition of T . A theory T having a definition is said to be -definable. Notice that distinct definitions of a -definable theory T need not be equivalent in T , and that every n -definable consistent theory always has two n definitions which are not T -equivalent (see Corollary 4.6 below).
We say a formula σ (u) is a binumeration of a theory T in a theory U if and only if for any sentence ϕ, U σ ( ϕ ) whenever ϕ ∈ T , and U ¬σ ( ϕ ) whenever ϕ / ∈ T . When a binumeration σ (u) is a formula, we say σ (u) a binumeration. For each formula σ (u), we can construct a formula Prf σ (x, y) which states "a sentence with the code x has a proof with the code y from the set of all sentences satisfying σ (u)", and the formula Prf σ (x, y) is called the proof predicate of σ (u) (see Feferman (1960) ). For n > 0, if σ (u) is n (resp. n ), the resulting formula Prf σ (x, y) is n (PA) (resp. n (PA)). Define Pr σ (x) to be the formula ∃yPrf σ (x, y) which is called the provability predicate of σ (u). If σ (u) is a definition of a theory T , then Pr σ (x) is a definition of the theory {ϕ : T ϕ}.
For each definition σ (u) of T , the consistency assertion Con σ of σ (u) is defined as ¬Pr σ ( 0 =1 ), which expresses the consistency of T . If σ (u) is n , then Con σ is a n (PA) sentence. Let (σ |x)(u) be the formula σ (u) ∧ u < x. Then for each n ∈ ω, the formula (σ |n)(u) is a definition of the finite subtheory {ϕ ∈ T : gn(ϕ) < n} of T .
The following facts hold (see Feferman (1960) and Lindström (1997) ).
FACT 2.1. Let T and U be theories, and σ (x) be a binumeration of T in U .
If p ∈ ω is a code of a T -proof of ϕ, then U Prf σ ( ϕ ,p).

If q ∈ ω is not a code of any T -proof of ϕ, then U ¬Prf σ ( ϕ ,q).
FACT 2.2. Let σ (u) and τ (u) be any formulas.
FACT 2. 3 (See Mostowski (1952) ). Let T be a subtheory of U . If σ (u) is a binumeration of T in U , then U Con σ |n for any n ∈ ω.
Let be either n+1 or n+1 , then it is known that there is a formula True (x) which is a truth-definition for sentences in , that is, for any formula ϕ(x) ∈ , PA ∀x(ϕ(x) ↔ True ( ϕ(ẋ) )), where ϕ(ẋ) is the standard dot notation, and notice that x is free in True ( ϕ(ẋ) ) (see Lindström (1997) ). Then the formula True (x) is a definition of the set Th (N) := {ϕ ∈ : N | ϕ} of all true sentences in . On the other hand, Tarski's undefinability theorem says that there exists no formula defining the set TA := {ϕ : N | ϕ} of all true sentences. Also there is a 1 (PA) formula True 0 (x) which is a truth-definition for sentences in 0 (see Kaye (1991) ).
Define Pr σ,n (x) to be the formula ∃v(True n+1 (v) ∧ Pr σ (v→x)). Then we have the following proposition (see Smoryński (1985) ). PROPOSITION 2.4. Let σ (x) be any n+1 definition of a theory T .
). §3. Notions related to consistency and completeness. In this section, we introduce some notions related to consistency and completeness of theories and show several properties of these notions. DEFINITION 3.1. Let T be a theory and be a class of formulas.
T is -sound if and only if for all sentences
ϕ, N | ϕ whenever T ϕ.
T is sound if and only if T is n -sound for any n ∈ ω.
T is -consistent if and only if for all formulas
then T ∃xϕ(x). 4. T is ω-consistent if and only if T is n -consistent for any n ∈ ω. 5. T is -complete if and only if for all sentences ϕ, T ϕ whenever N | ϕ.
T is -decisive if and only if for all sentences ϕ, either T ϕ or T ¬ϕ holds.
It is well-known that every extension of PA is 1 -complete. It is easy to see that a theory T is complete if and only if T is n -decisive for all n ∈ ω, and that T is consistent if and only if T is 0 -sound. The notion of ω-consistency was introduced in Gödel (1931) , and n−1 -consistency was originally introduced in Kreisel (1957) under the name 'n-consistency'.
We exhibit several properties of these notions. PROPOSITION 3.2 (See Hájek (1977) and Smoryński (1977b) 3.3 (See Smoryński (1977b) 
It is known that for n = 1, 2, the n -soundness of T is equivalent to the n -consistency of T . Also, an ω-consistent complete theory is deductively equivalent to TA (see Isaacson (2011) and Smoryński (1977b) ). The following proposition is a stratified version of these results. PROPOSITION 3.5.
If n ≤ 2 and T is n -consistent, then T is n -sound.
If n ≥ 3, T is n -consistent and n−2 -decisive, then T is n -sound.
Proof. We only prove clause 2. Actually, we prove the statement for n ≥ 2 by induction on n. The statement for n = 2 is already obtained in clause 1. Suppose that the statement holds for n. Let T be any n+1 -consistent and n−1 -decisive theory, and ϕ(x, y) be any
It is known that there exists a 1 -definable theory which is ω-consistent but not 3 -sound (cf. Lindström (1997) p. 36). Thus for n ≥ 3, n -consistency does not imply n -soundness in general. COROLLARY 3.6. If T is ω-consistent and complete, then T is deductively equivalent to TA.
We obtain the following relations between several properties a theory may have. PROPOSITION 3.7. For n > 0, the following are equivalent:
1. T is n -complete and consistent; 2. T is n -sound and n -decisive; 3. T is n -consistent and n -decisive.
Proof. (1 ⇒ 2): Suppose that T is a n -complete consistent theory. Let ϕ be any n sentence.
First, we prove the n -soundness of T . If T ϕ, then T ¬ϕ by the consistency of T . Since ¬ϕ is a n sentence, we have N | ¬ϕ by n -completeness. Thus N | ϕ, and T is n -sound. Secondly, we prove that T is n -decisive. Suppose T ¬ϕ, then N | ϕ as we have seen above. Since T is also n+1 -complete and ϕ is a n sentence, we obtain T ϕ, and thus T is n -decisive.
(2 ⇒ 1): Suppose that T is n -sound and n -decisive. Obviously, T is consistent. Let ϕ be any n sentence such that N | ϕ. By n -soundness, T ¬ϕ. Then T ϕ because T is n -decisive. Therefore T is n -complete.
(2 ⇔ 3): This is immediate from Propositions 3.3 and 3.5.
The following characterization of n -soundness is formally presented in Beklemishev (2005) Lemma 2.9.
PROPOSITION 3.8. A theory T is n -sound if and only if T
+ Th n+1 (N) is consistent.
Proof. (⇒):
We show the contrapositive. Suppose that T + Th n+1 (N) is inconsistent. Then there is a true n+1 sentence ϕ such that T ¬ϕ. Since ¬ϕ is a false n+1 sentence, T is not n+1 -sound. By Proposition 3.2.1, T is not n -sound.
(⇐): We again show the contrapositive. Suppose that T is not n -sound, then T proves a false n sentence ϕ. Then T + ¬ϕ is inconsistent, and ¬ϕ ∈ Th n+1 (N). Therefore T + Th n+1 (N) is inconsistent. §4. The first incompleteness theorem. Gödel constructed in Gödel (1931) a true but T -unprovable 1 sentence, called the Gödel sentence of T , for each 1 -definable consistent theory T . Moreover, if T is ω-consistent, then such a sentence is not refutable in T , and therefore it is undecidable in T . This is Gödel's first incompleteness theorem. The ω-consistency assumption can be replaced by 1 -consistency in the proof of the first incompleteness theorem. We have seen in Propositions 3.3 and 3.5 that 1 -consistency is equivalent to 1 -soundness. Then we have FACT 4.1 (Gödel's first incompleteness theorem).
If T is 1 -definable and consistent, then T is not
There are two improvements of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, which were obtained by Rosser and Jeroslow, respectively. Rosser improved in Rosser (1936) the second clause of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem by replacing the 1 -soundness assumption by the consistency of the theory. Let Th(T ) be the set of all theorems of T . Note that if T is 1 -definable, then Th(T ) is also 1 -definable, and thus 2 (N)-definable. Jeroslow improved the first clause of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, which is Theorem 2 in Jeroslow (1975) . 1 -complete. In the Gödel-Rosser first incompleteness theorem, the 1 -definability assumption of T cannot be replaced by the 2 (N)-definability because of the following fact. Thus the Gödel-Rosser first incompleteness theorem cannot be extended to n -definable theories directly. On the other hand, Gödel's first incompleteness theorem is directly generalized to n -definable theories. We give a proof of such a generalization, however, later we improve it in two ways.
FACT 4.3 (See Jeroslow (1975)). If Th(T ) is 2 (N)-definable and T is consistent, then T is not
THEOREM 4.5.
If T is n+1 -definable and consistent, then T is not n+1 -complete.
If T is n+1 -definable and n+1 -sound, then T is not n+1 -decisive.
Proof. Clause 2 is immediate from clause 1 by Proposition 3.7, thus it suffices to prove clause 1. Let T be a n+1 -definable consistent theory. If T is not n -complete, T is not n+1 -complete. Thus we may assume that T is n -complete. By Proposition 3.2, T is also n+1 -complete.
Let σ (u) be a n+1 definition of T . The provability predicate Pr σ (x) is a n+1 formula. There is a n+1 sentence ψ satisfying PA ψ ↔ ¬Pr σ ( ψ ) by Fixed-Point Lemma (see Lindström (1997) for details). If T ψ, then Pr σ ( ψ ) is a true n+1 sentence. By our assumption, T Pr σ ( ψ ). Thus T ¬ψ. This contradicts the consistency of T .
Therefore T ψ. Also T ¬Pr σ ( ψ ). Then ¬Pr σ ( ψ ) is a n+1 sentence which is true but not T -provable. Therefore T is not n+1 -complete.
From the first clause of Theorem 4.5, we obtain nonT -equivalent n+1 definitions of n+1 -definable consistent theory T . For n = 0, this is well-known (see Feferman (1960) Proof. Let σ 0 (u) be any n+1 definition of T . We may assume that T ∃u¬σ 0 (u) (otherwise, replace σ 0 (u) by σ 0 (u) ∧ u = 0 =1 ). Since T is n+1 -definable and consistent, there exists a true n+1 sentence ϕ which is not provable in T by Theorem 4.5.1.
First, we improve the second clause of Theorem 4.5. Specifically, we prove that the assumption of n+1 -soundness in the statement can be replaced by n -soundness. This is a generalized version of the Gödel-Rosser first incompleteness theorem. In our proof, we use a generalized version of Craig's trick. 
THEOREM 4.8. If T is n+1 -definable and n -sound, then T is not n+1 -decisive.
Proof. Suppose that T is n+1 -definable and n -sound. It follows that T +Th n+1 (N) is n+1 -definable and consistent by Proposition 3.8. By Craig's trick, there is a n -definable theory T which is deductively equivalent to T + Th n+1 (N). Let γ (u) be a n definition of T , then γ (u) is a binumeration of T in T because T knows all n+1 -truth.
The proof predicate Prf γ (x, y) of γ (u) is a n+1 (PA) formula. Let ψ be a n+1 sentence such that PA ψ ↔ ∀y(Prf γ ( ψ , y) → ∃z < yPrf γ ( ¬ψ , z)). Then neither ψ nor ¬ψ is provable in T by a usual argument of the proof of Rosser's incompleteness theorem. Since ψ is n+1 , T is not n+1 -decisive. Hence also T is not n+1 -decisive. In the next section, we give an alternative proof of Theorem 4.8 (see Corollary 5.14). Theorem 4.8 can be slightly strengthened as follows.
THEOREM 4.9. If T is n+1 -definable and n -consistent, then T is not n+1 -decisive.
Proof. The statement for n = 0 is exactly Gödel's first incompleteness theorem because Secondly, we improve the first clause of Theorem 4.5 along the direction of Jeroslow's improvement. One improvement like that has already been made by Hájek.
FACT 4.10 (See Hájek (1977)). If Th(T ) is n+2 (PA)-definable and T is consistent, then T is not n+1 -complete.
Hájek also proved another generalization of the first incompleteness theorem.
FACT 4.11 (See Hájek (1977)). If Th(T ) is n+2 -definable and T is n+2 -consistent, then T is not n+1 -complete.
Facts 4.10 and 4.11 are Theorems 2.8 and 2.5 in Hájek (1977) , respectively. Since 2 (N) sets are not always 2 (PA) in general, Fact 4.10 is not a generalization of Jeroslow's result.
We prove that the assumption of the n+2 -consistency in Fact 4.11 can be replaced by consistency.
THEOREM 4.12. If Th(T ) is n+1 -definable and T is consistent, then T is not
n -complete. Proof. Let T be a consistent theory such that Th(T ) is n+1 -definable, and let ∀xτ (u, x) be a n+1 definition of Th(T ) where τ (u, x) is a n formula. Let ϕ be a n+1 sentence satisfying the following equivalence:
Define ψ to be the n+1 sentence ∃x(¬τ ( ¬ϕ , x) ∧ ∀y < x τ ( ϕ , y)). Then it is easy to show PA ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ. Since T is consistent, at least one of ϕ /
Towards contradiction, we assume that T is n -complete. Then T is also n+1 -complete by Proposition 3.2. We distinguish two cases N | ϕ and N | ψ.
If N | ϕ, then T ϕ by our assumption. Thus ϕ ∈ Th(T ). On the other hand, we have N | ¬∀xτ ( ϕ , x) by the choice of ϕ. Then ϕ / ∈ Th(T ) since ∀xτ (u, x) defines Th(T ). This is a contradiction. If N | ψ, then T ψ by our assumption. Then T ¬ϕ, and hence ¬ϕ ∈ Th(T ). On the other hand, we have N | ¬∀xτ ( ¬ϕ , x) by the definition of ψ. Then ¬ϕ / ∈ Th(T ). This is also a contradiction.
We conclude that T is not n -complete.
By Theorem 4.12, if Th(T ) is n+2 -definable and T is consistent, then T is not n+1 -complete. This is a generalization of Jeroslow's result and an improvement of Hájek's results. Also the n = 0 case of Theorem 4.12 states that there is no consistent theory T such that Th(T ) is 1 -definable. This is an improvement of Remark 2.6(1) in Hájek (1977) which states that there is no 1 -consistent theory T such that Th(T ) is 1 -definable.
From Theorem 4.12 and Proposition 3.7, we immediately obtain the following corollary, which is also an improvement of the second clause of Theorem 4.5.
COROLLARY 4.13. If Th(T ) is n+2 -definable and T is n+1 -consistent, then T is not n+1 -decisive.
Hájek proposed the following problem, in Problem 2.9 of Hájek (1977) Every Lindenbaum completion of PA + Th n+1 (N) (see Lemma 3.2 in Hájek (1977) ) witnesses this example. §5. The second incompleteness theorem. Like Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, Gödel's second incompleteness theorem is also a theorem for 1 -definable theories. The second incompleteness theorem states that if T is 1 -definable and consistent, then T cannot prove its own consistency. However the statement described above is ambiguous because it is known that the unprovability of consistency statements depends on the underlying representation of T , and thus we must state Gödel's second incompleteness theorem more precisely. Feferman showed that ' 1 definition' in the statement of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem cannot be replaced by ' 1 definition'.
FACT 5.2 (Feferman, 1960) 
Therefore Gödel's second incompleteness theorem cannot be generalized to n+1 -definable theories directly. On the other hand, the second incompleteness theorem can be seen as a theorem about soundness since the consistency of a theory is equivalent to its 0 -soundness.
For every definition σ (u) of T , the uniform n reflection principle RFN n (σ ) of σ (u) is the sentence ∀x( n (x) ∧ Pr σ (x) → True n (x)) expressing the n -soundness of T , where n (x) is the natural 1 (PA) binumeration of the set of all n sentences. The uniform reflection principle RFN(σ ) of σ (u) is the theory {RFN n (σ ) : n ≥ 1} which expresses the soundness of T .
Let Con σ,n be the sentence ¬Pr σ,n ( 0 =1 ). If σ (u) defines the theory T , then Con σ,n can be seen as a formal consistency statement of T + Th n+1 (N). By using the properties of partial truth-definitions True n+1 (x) and Proposition 2.4, Proposition 3.8 can be formalized in PA as follows.
Since RFN 0 (σ ) and Con σ are equivalent in PA for any 1 definition σ (u) of any 1 definable theory, Gödel's second incompleteness theorem can be restated as follows.
THEOREM 5.4 (Gödel's second incompleteness theorem). For any 1 -definable theory T , the following are equivalent:
By Theorem 5.6, we can conclude that Gödel's second incompleteness theorem (Theorem 5.4 (1 ⇔ 2)) is the n = 0 case of the general property about the n -soundness of n+1 -definable theories.
Under an appropriate interpretation, we can understand that Jeroslow proved a version of the second incompleteness theorem for a class of 2 -definable theories. That is, Jeroslow's proof of Theorem 6 in Jeroslow (1975) essentially showed the following fact. FACT 5.7 (See Jeroslow (1975) Proof. Let T be a 1 -definable theory which is ω-consistent but not 3 -sound (see our remark just after Proposition 3.5). Let σ (u) be the 4 definition of T from our proof of Theorem 5.6 (3 ⇒ 1). 4 Then T proves RFN(σ ).
From this proposition, we obtain a 3 -consistent 4 -definable theory T having a 4 definition σ (u) such that T proves the 3 -consistency of σ (u) . Therefore the n -soundness assumption in the statement of Theorem 5.6 cannot be replaced by n -consistency throughout.
Finally, we investigate several properties of consistency statements. First, we give a characterization of the unprovability of the negation of consistency assertions.
THEOREM 5.10. For any n+1 -definable theory T , the following are equivalent:
If T is n+1 -sound, then the n+1 sentence Con σ is true for any n+1 definition σ (u) of T . By the n+1 -soundness of T , T does not prove ¬Con σ .
(2 ⇒ 1): We show the contrapositive. Suppose that T is not n+1 -sound, then there is a n+1 sentence ϕ such that T ϕ and N | ¬ϕ.
We obtain the following corollaries. Let τ (u) be any n definition of T . Also let σ (u) be a n+1 formula satisfying the following equivalence:
where ψ(x) is the formula ∀z ≤ x¬Prf τ ( ¬Con σ , z) .
Towards contradiction, suppose T Con σ . Then T ¬Con σ , and thus N | ψ(n) holds for any n ∈ ω. Hence N | σ (n) holds for any n ∈ ω because N | ∃y(Prf τ ( Con σ , y) ∧ ψ(y) ). Then the formula σ (u) is a definition of a trivially inconsistent theory, and thus we have N | ¬Con σ . This contradicts the n+1 -soundness of T because Con σ is a n+1 sentence. Therefore T Con σ .
Again towards contradiction, suppose T ¬Con σ and let p be a natural number such that N | Prf τ ( ¬Con σ ,p). Then T + Th n+1 (N) Prf τ ( ¬Con σ ,p) because this sentence is true n+1 . Hence
Since T Con σ , the n sentence ∀y <p¬Prf τ ( Con σ , y) is true. Together with (1), this implies
By (1) and (2) Notice that the n = 0 case of Theorem 5.13 is a consequence of Theorem 7.4 in Feferman (1960) . By Craig's trick, we immediately obtain the following corollary.
COROLLARY 5.14. If T is n+1 -definable and n -sound, then there exists a n+1 definition σ (u) of some axiomatization of Th(T ) such that T Con σ and T ¬Con σ .
Our generalization of the Gödel-Rosser first incompleteness Theorem (Theorem 4.8) follows from Corollary 5.14. Thus we obtain that the witnesses for Theorem 4.8 can be provided by appropriate consistency statements.
By combining Corollary 5.11 and Theorem 5.13, we obtain the following corollary.
COROLLARY 5.15. If T is n -definable and consistent, then there are n+1 definitions σ 1 (u) and σ 2 (u) of T such that T Con σ 1 and T ¬Con σ 2 .
Proof. Suppose that T is n -definable and consistent. If T is n -sound, then this is obvious by Theorem 5.13. If T is not n -sound, then there are n+1 definitions σ 1 (u) and σ 2 (u) of T such that T ¬Con σ 1 and T Con σ 2 by Corollary 5.11. Since T is consistent, T Con σ 1 and T ¬Con σ 2 .
In contrast to Theorem 5.10, it follows from Corollary 5.15 that for n -definable theory T , the existence of a n+1 definition σ (u) of T with T ¬Con σ does not imply any kind of soundness of T in general.
